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An empirical analysis of the impact of labour market structures on the response of inflation to 
macroeconomic shocks is presented. Results based on a 20 country panel show that if 
labour market coordination is high, the effect on inflation of movements in unemployment, 
import prices, tax rates and productivity is dampened, both on impact and dynamically. In 
contrast, monopoly power in labour supply, measured by the percentage unionisation of the 
workforce, appears to amplify the response of inflation to its reduced form determinants. 
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 1 Introduction
Empirical modelling of the in￿ ation process has a long history in macroeconomics. Studies
in this area have typically employed extended Phillips curve models that explain in￿ ation in
terms of its own lags (possibly proxying for in￿ ation expectations), the unemployment rate and
factors that may shift the aggregate supply curve, for instance productivity growth and import
price in￿ ation. Although the demand and cost-side variables that enter a reduced form in￿ ation
equation are likely to be similar across countries, the coe¢ cients multiplying these variables
di⁄er substantially. Boschen and Weise (2004), for example, document large di⁄erences in the
impact of oil and commodity price shocks on in￿ ation rates across the OECD, and explain these
di⁄erences using a measure of political support for low in￿ ation. In this paper we examine the
impact on in￿ ation adjustment of two important characteristics of the labour market - the degree
of coordination amongst labour organisations and the percentage unionisation of the workforce.
These variables may a⁄ect the response of in￿ ation to macroeconomic shocks through in￿ uencing
wage dynamics.
The empirical evidence that we present is based on panel data for 20 OECD countries
observed from the 1960s through to the 1990s. The analysis yields two main ￿ndings. Firstly,
the response of in￿ ation to lagged in￿ ation, unemployment, productivity growth and import
price in￿ ation is a decreasing function of the level of labour market coordination. Thus, for a
given path for each of these variables, the evolution of in￿ ation will be more stable in countries
in which labour market coordination is above the OECD average. Secondly, the e⁄ect of import
price in￿ ation, productivity growth and indirect tax changes on in￿ ation increases with the
unionisation rate, implying that the trajectory of in￿ ation is more volatile the more highly
unionised the labour market, all other factors held constant. These ￿ndings are generally robust
to controlling for further determinants of in￿ ation dynamics, varying the time and cross-sectional
dimensions of the panel and adopting alternative methods of estimation.
The remainder of the paper develops these points and is structured as follows. Section 2
expands on the potential links between labour market structures and the parameters determining
in￿ ation adjustment. Section 3 sets out the econometric model used to measure the strength
of these e⁄ects and describes the data. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5
1concludes.
2 Labour markets and in￿ ation adjustment
It has often been recognised that labour market structures play a role in determining the response
of in￿ ation to macroeconomic shocks. Bruno and Sachs (1985) argue that the relatively mild
increase in German in￿ ation following the oil price shocks of the 1970s was in part due to the
corporatist structures in which German labour unions participated, as this set of arrangements
facilitated a deceleration of wages that in turn restricted in￿ ation pressures. In more recent
contributions both Burdekin and Siklos (1999) and Boschen and Weise (2004) note a possible
role for labour market structures in accounting for cross-country di⁄erences in in￿ ation dynamics.
The extent to which unions coordinate their actions during the wage bargaining process is a
potential determinant of the responsiveness of in￿ ation to supply- and demand-side pressures.
In highly coordinated labour markets wage negotiations occur close together in time and the
level of communication between unions representing di⁄erent groups of workers is high. This
means that unions are more likely to be aware of the macroeconomic consequences of their
decisions.1 If the union objective function depends on in￿ ation as well as unemployment and
the real wage, as in Cukierman and Lippi (1999) for example, unions will have an incentive to
moderate wage demands in order to limit the increase in in￿ ation associated with macroeconomic
imbalances such as unemployment below the natural rate or an increase in the cost of imports.
This incentive will be felt more strongly in coordinated labour markets in which unions are
better able to make the connection between wage demands and subsequent price increases. In
contrast, when coordination is limited unions may act assuming that their decisions do not
1Labour market coordination is closely related to the concept of labour market centralisation, the e⁄ects of
which have been studied by, inter alia, Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999). Centrali-
sation is the inverse of the number of unions in the market. A high level of centralisation is likely to yield a high
level of coordination, since a small number of unions increases the chances of synchronised wage negotiations.
However, it should be noted that a market comprising many unions may still be associated with a high level of
coordination, e.g. if the government sponsors a forum for wage negotiations. Likewise, a centralised market may
still lead to low coordination if unions attempt to ￿ leapfrog￿one another in securing pay deals. Thus, centralisation
and coordination are distinct concepts.
2a⁄ect macroeconomic outcomes, in which case wage moderation will be limited and the upturn
in in￿ ation high. Thus, a key hypothesis that we test is that macroeconomic variables such as
unemployment and import prices exert smaller e⁄ects on in￿ ation in highly coordinated labour
markets.
The percentage of workers that are members of a trade union may also a⁄ect in￿ ation
adjustment. If higher unionisation rates are associated with increased monopoly power in the
labour market, workers may be able to extract greater compensation following cost shocks that
raise the cost of living, or demand shocks that lead to labour shortages. Consequently the
upturn in in￿ ation associated with these shocks will be larger. Hence, this paper also tests for
stronger responses of in￿ ation to macroeconomic conditions when unionisation rates are above
the OECD average.
The e⁄ect of labour market structures on the relationship between in￿ ation and measures
of costs and excess demand may take e⁄ect through time rather than being con￿ned to a single
period. Therefore we also test for a link between labour market institutions and the extent to
which in￿ ation depends upon lagged in￿ ation, since this autoregressive parameter in￿ uences the
shape of the impulse response line for in￿ ation following a shift in one of the its determinants.
The extent of the backward-looking component in in￿ ation is often referred to as in￿ ation persis-
tence and is the focus of a large literature in macroeconomics. In recent contributions, Driscoll
and Holden (2003a, 2004) argue that in￿ ation persistence is the result of coordination failure
in the labour market, and based upon this insight one could conjecture a negative relationship
between the autoregressive parameter for in￿ ation and the extent of labour market coordination.
Although the results that we present in Section 4 are consistent with this hypothesis, we do not
emphasise the ￿nding given that we estimate in￿ ation persistence conditional upon many other
variables (see the discussion below), whilst the theoretical literature focuses upon unconditional
in￿ ation persistence. The impact of labour market structures on in￿ ation persistence is an
important topic for future research.
33 Econometric methodology
In order to investigate the determinants of in￿ ation adjustment we use pooled time series data
for 20 OECD countries to ￿t a model in which in￿ ation is explained in terms of lagged in￿ ation
and measures of excess demand and input costs. Interactions between these macroeconomic
variables and institutional characteristics then account for cross-country and temporal variation
in the coe¢ cients of the reduced form in￿ ation equation. Speci￿cally, we estimate models of the
form
infit = ￿0 + ￿0
1x1 + ￿0
2x2 + ￿i + ￿t + "it (1)
where i denotes a country2 and t a year from the period 1961￿95. The term inf is the annual






x1 comprises macroeconomic variables that in￿ uence in￿ ation and x2 comprises interactions
between the variables in x1 and the two labour market variables, namely coordination and
union density (further discussion is provided below). The model allows the regression intercept
to vary across countries via the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i, and the time dummies ￿t control for unobserved
in￿ uences on in￿ ation that are common across countries, e.g. a reduction in the price-cost
markup arising from increased competition as part of the globalisation process. The properties
of the error term "it will be addressed in the discussion of the estimation technique at the end
of this section.
Macroeconomic variables The variables included in x1 are all measured in decimal form
(a reading of 1% corresponds to :01) and are de￿ned below (data sources are provided in the
appendix).
￿ infit￿1 is the lagged in￿ ation rate.
￿ unempit is the deviation of the unemployment rate from its trend level. The trend is
calculated separately for each country using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter based on a smoothing
2The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and
the US.
4parameter of 400 (the recommended value for annual observations). Detrending of the unem-
ployment series is intended to remove permanent shifts that re￿ ect structural rather than cyclical
in￿ uences on unemployment.3
￿ importit is the rate of import price in￿ ation multiplied by the openness of country i, the
latter being measured as the average ratio of nominal import expenditures to nominal GDP over
the period 1961￿95. This adjustment controls for the fact that import price in￿ ation will a⁄ect
consumer price in￿ ation with a larger coe¢ cient in relatively open economies and therefore deals
with a potential source of parameter heterogeneity.4
￿ prodit is the rate of productivity growth scaled by one minus average openness (the latter
again measured over 1961 ￿ 95). Productivity growth is de￿ned as the percentage change in
output per person employed. The adjustment applied controls for the fact that domestic pro-
ductivity growth will be more important in restricting in￿ ation pressures in relatively closed
economies.
￿ itaxit is the percentage growth rate of the indirect tax wedge, constructed as total indirect
taxes minus total subsidies, all divided by private ￿nal expenditures (a scaling factor based on
openness is not applied because indirect taxes apply to both imported and domestically produced
goods).
￿ dtaxit is the growth rate of the ratio of direct taxes to households￿current receipts scaled
by one minus average openness.
The data are available for the period 1961 ￿ 95. A more natural sample period would
be 1961 ￿ 98 because 1998 is the last year prior to the introduction of the European single
currency. After this date the in￿ ation processes for many countries may have changed due
to exchange rates being ￿xed permanently and control of interest rates being handed to the
European Central Bank. Unfortunately we were unable to collect data on the two tax variables
for the period 1996￿98 and therefore the core sample period is 1961￿95. However, in the next
section we report a regression for the 1961￿98 period that uses the variables that are available,
3It is recognised, however, that statistical ￿ltering has been criticised in some parts of the literature and
therefore later in the paper we check the robustness of our results using an unadjusted series for unemployment.
4Average openness for 1961 ￿ 95 rather than openness at the annual frequency is used as the scaling factor
because the latter may be a⁄ected by cyclical e⁄ects that are handled by a separate regressor.
5and ￿nd that the results are very similar to those obtained for the core sample.
Labour market characteristics The labour market variables are de￿ned below. See the
appendix for data sources, Nickell et al (2005) and the references therein for further details
concerning the construction of the variables, and Nunziata (2004a) for a description of the
di⁄erent series and a discussion of the splicing technique used to ensure comparability of the
￿gures for Germany before and after uni￿cation.
￿ COORD measures the extent to which parties to wage bargaining are able to take account
of the macroeconomic consequences of their decisions. This depends on factors such as the level
at which negotiations take place (e.g. the national, industry or plant level) and the role of the
government in coordinating wage negotiations. The index lies in the range 1￿3, where 3 denotes
the highest level of coordination.
￿ TU is the union membership rate for employees, often referred to as trade union density.
The feasible range for this variable is 0 ￿ 1.
The vector x2 contains interactions between the macroeconomic variables in x1 and the
labour market variables. If the impact on in￿ ation of a macroeconomic variable xa1 depends on,
say, labour market coordination, the strength of this e⁄ect will be measured by the coe¢ cient
multiplying xa1 ￿ coord. In the x2 vector all variables measuring labour market characteristics
are de￿ned such that their mean across the panel is zero, i.e. they di⁄er by a constant from
the original series. This ensures that the coe¢ cient on each macroeconomic variable can be
interpreted as the coe¢ cient of the "average" country, i.e. the country characterised by the
sample average value of the labour market characteristic. In the results section a variable
preceded by Z indicates that it is in zero mean form.
The macroeconomic variables entering equation (1) are all growth rates, except unemploy-
ment which is a deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott trend. Empirical models of in￿ ation often
feature error correction terms, de￿ned as the gap between the current price level and a long-
run solution for prices (all variables in logs). A typical long-run solution for the price level
would be a weighted average of unit labour costs (wages paid per unit of output) and import
prices, see for example de Brouwer and Ericsson (1998). In equation (1) terms in wages are
deliberately excluded because wage adjustment is the channel through which we expect labour
6market structures to a⁄ect the responsiveness of in￿ ation to unemployment, import price shocks,
productivity growth and tax shocks. Therefore, in general, it will not be possible to specify a
correct long-run solution for prices using the variables in (1).5 Instead, we concentrate on the
relationship between growth rates, though in extensions of our main results we experiment with
some error correction type terms and ￿nd that our conclusions are largely unaltered.
3.1 The estimation procedure
Initially we assume that the error process, " in equation (1), is heteroscedastic but that individual
elements are uncorrelated across both i and t. This implies that the model can be estimated
by OLS and t-ratios calculated using the heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors due to
White (1980).6
Before proceeding to the empirical results we discuss three issues relevant to the estimation
of macro panel models. Firstly, the second moments of the OLS estimator depend on the order
of integration of the variables. The macroeconomic variables are formulated as ￿rst di⁄erences
of price or production variables (except unemp which is a deviation from a Hodrick-Prescott
trend) and we therefore hypothesise that each of them is I(0). This is largely con￿rmed by
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests conducted separately for each country and each series:
A total of 114 tests performed rejected the unit root hypothesis 99=114 times, with 9=15 of the
non-rejections occurring for the unemployment variable (tests were not carried out for Portugal
because the data start in 1975, leaving relatively few degrees of freedom). Given that the ADF
test often has low power in samples of the size that we are using, we treat unemp as an I(0)
variable.7 The institutional variables included in x2 are often constant for long periods or change
only very slowly, and as such are not amenable to unit root testing. However, as they are both
bounded processes they cannot drift without limit and therefore will not introduce spurious
non-stationarity to the model.
5In terms of the underlying econometrics, the levels of prices and costs are normally thought of as I(1) processes
that cointegrate to yield an I(0) error correction term that drives the I(0) in￿ ation rate. Excluding wages from
the analysis implies that a cointegrating vector is unlikely to exist, in which case an error correction model cannot
be speci￿ed.
6Unless otherwise stated, estimation results were obtained using PcGive 10.0, see Doornik and Hendry (2000).
7Details of the unit root tests are available on request.
7Secondly, Nickell (1981) shows that OLS estimation is inconsistent when applied to models





, where T is the time dimension of the panel. As T = 35 in this case, any ￿ Nickell
bias￿will be extremely limited. This is con￿rmed in Judson and Owen (1999), who demonstrate
by means of Monte Carlo simulations that OLS estimation of the dynamic ￿xed e⁄ects model
performs well for T > 30.
Thirdly, the pooled regression model that we estimate is valid only under the assumption
that the slope coe¢ cients are homogeneous across countries. In the case of the ￿0
1 coe¢ cients in
(1) an obvious source of heterogeneity is handled by scaling relevant variables according to the
openness of each country, as discussed above. The remaining heterogeneity in the ￿0
1 is the main
focus of the analysis, in that we attempt to explain this variation using the vector of labour
market institutions (and in robustness checks the set of controls used to explain parameter
heterogeneity is extended to include central bank independence, the exchange rate regime and
dummy variables for periods of in￿ ation targeting and international wars). Thus, a wide range
of controls are used to account for possible cross-country heterogeneity in the ￿0
1 coe¢ cients.
There remains the possibility of cross-country heterogeneity in ￿0
2, the coe¢ cients measur-
ing the impact of labour market institutions on the response of in￿ ation to its reduced form
determinants. A test of parameter homogeneity such as that proposed by Roy (1957), Zellner
(1962) and Baltagi (1995) cannot be carried out because for some countries the coord variable is
constant over the sample period, which means that (1) cannot be estimated separately for each
country. Instead, we evaluate the extent of parameter heterogeneity through estimating (1) for
sub-samples obtained through deleting one country at a time from the panel; if parameter het-
erogeneity is important the recursively estimated coe¢ cients will appear unstable. As we report
in section 4.2, the estimation results are remarkably stable, suggesting that any violations of the
pooling assumptions necessary to estimate ￿0
2 do not seriously a⁄ect the results.
4 Empirical results
In Table 1 we present some basic regressions. The sample comprises 644 observations, but 6 of
them are accounted for by including impulse dummies. These observations were identi￿ed by
8running a simple AR(1) model, including ￿xed e⁄ects and time dummies, and identifying the
residuals more than four times larger (in absolute value) than the residual standard deviation.
Such larger outliers correspond to special events in the data, for instance a surge in UK in￿ ation
following the removal of price controls in 1975, and may exert undue in￿ uence on estimated
in￿ ation dynamics.8
The ￿rst column of Table 1 contains the basic determinants of in￿ ation, but does not include
interaction terms. Each variable is signi￿cant at the 5% level or better, the error autocorrelation
tests do not indicate model mis-speci￿cation and the regression standard error, at 1:61%, is
roughly one third of the unconditional standard deviation for in￿ ation. The coe¢ cient estimates
are reasonable despite the level of aggregation that the model entails. For example given that
import price in￿ ation has been scaled by openness, its expected equilibrium impact on in￿ ation is
unity, which is within two standard errors of the static coe¢ cient for import, which is :39
1￿:56 = :89.
The coe¢ cient on the productivity term indicates that only one ￿fth of a productivity im-
provement is re￿ ected in lower prices in the ￿rst year, with the remainder being passed into
higher wages or higher pro￿ts. It is possible that some attenuation bias a⁄ects this coe¢ cient
because of measurement errors in the productivity data, e.g. due to changes in average hours
worked per person, which have not been taken into account due to a lack of data. The tax
coe¢ cients are small, but not implausible. Suppose that the average sales tax over the sample
is 10%. A 1% increase in the variable itax then corresponds to a 0:1% increase in the sales tax
rate, which one might expect to induce a 0:1% increase in prices, and 0:1 is approximately the
value of the static coe¢ cient that multiplies itax. It is more di¢ cult to assign a prior to the
value of the dtax coe¢ cient given that it will mainly depend on the elasticity of wages with
respect to the direct tax wedge, which is an unknown parameter.
Columns (2) and (3) add interactions between the macroeconomic variables and zero mean
versions of coord and tu and in column (4) a restricted speci￿cation is reported.9 This is
obtained from an iterative process in which the least signi￿cant term is deleted and the model
8The observations are: Japan 1974, New Zealand 1985, Portugal 1977, Portugal 1984, Spain 1977, United
Kingdom 1975.
9Interaction terms based on an index of employment protection were used in some early regressions but turned
out to be insigni￿cant. In order to save space we do not report these regressions
9re-estimated until all variables are signi￿cant at the 5% level. Coordination in the labour market
decreases the responsiveness of in￿ ation to movements in unemployment, import price in￿ ation
and productivity. The interaction between unemployment and coord is consistent with the
￿nding in Nunziata (2004b) that the responsiveness of real wages to unemployment is dampened
in highly coordinated labour markets. The negatively signed interaction between import price
in￿ ation and coordination is consistent with the conclusion of Bruno and Sachs (1985) that
corporatist economies were less severely a⁄ected by the oil price hikes of the 1970s because they
were able to reduce wage growth in order to accommodate adverse economic conditions. The
in￿ ation decreasing e⁄ect of productivity growth is weaker in highly coordinated labour markets,
possibly because ￿rms reward unions for wage moderation during periods of macroeconomic
stress through increasing wages by more when productivity growth is high.
The coe¢ cient on lagged in￿ ation is a decreasing function of labour market coordination.
This implies that in addition to squeezing the response of in￿ ation to movements in costs and
excess demand in the ￿rst year, labour market coordination dampens the dynamic response of
in￿ ation to such shocks. In sum, for a given pattern of shocks, high levels of labour market
coordination appear to smooth the trajectory of in￿ ation.
A relatively high unionisation rate increases the response of in￿ ation to import price and
indirect tax movements. One interpretation of this is that monopoly power in labour supply
causes wage negotiators to demand greater compensation following increases in the cost of living.
A surprising ￿nding is that relatively high levels of unionisation cause each 1% increase in
productivity to reduce in￿ ation by a larger amount. This may re￿ ect the fact that some of the
observations for productivity growth are actually negative. If high unionisation rates amplify
the increase in in￿ ation following a productivity reversal the coe¢ cient estimate for prod ￿ ztu
will turn out negative, as in column 4. Entering positive and negative productivity observations
separately in the model yields a coe¢ cient for prod￿ ￿ ztu that takes a larger negative value
than that for prod+ ￿ ztu, indicating some support for this idea (results are not reported in the
table). However, the latter e⁄ect is still negatively signed and both terms are insigni￿cant at
the 5% level. One possibility is that measurement errors a⁄ect the productivity variable and
are correlated with the unionisation rate. Alternatively it may be a chance ￿nding that re￿ ects
10a Type I error in the testing procedure (in some robustness checks reported later this particular
term loses signi￿cance at the 5% level).
In column (5) the levels of labour market coordination and union density are added to the
regression in order to check that the interaction terms are not simply proxies for the omission
of the levels of the labour market variables. The additional variables are insigni￿cant, while
the interaction e⁄ects are robust.10 Finally, in column (6) we extend the time series dimension
of the panel to 1998 for all variables except those involving tax terms and ￿nd that the main
e⁄ects of the labour market variables on in￿ ation adjustment are generally robust to using this
slightly larger sample.
The quantitative signi￿cance of the interaction terms In Table 2 we use the regression
results from Table 1, column 4 to assess the quantitative importance of labour market institutions
in setting in￿ ation dynamics. The ￿rst column lists the e⁄ects of each macro variable if both
coord and tu are at their sample averages (these are simply the ￿1 coe¢ cients from column 4 of
Table 1). In order to obtain the results in the next two columns we set coord and tu equal to their
time average values for each country and then calculate the total derivatives for in￿ ation with
respect to each macroeconomic variable. The columns headed ￿ Absolute max￿and ￿ Absolute
min￿give the maximum and minimum absolute values respectively for the total derivatives, and
the countries for which those values occur are given beneath the coe¢ cients.
The maximum and minimum derivatives calculated for each of the explanatory variables
di⁄er considerably. In each case the maximum absolute parameter is roughly twice that es-
timated for the ￿ average￿country, while the minimum absolute parameter is close to zero. If
all countries experience a 10% increase in import prices in a particular year, consumer price
in￿ ation in Canada rises by 1:3% in that year (10￿0:55￿0:24, where 0:24 measures the openness
of the Canadian economy) while consumer price in￿ ation in Japan rises by just 0:04% over the
10The insigni￿cance of the levels of labour market coordination and union density is expected given that we
estimate a reduced form equation that explains most of the variation in in￿ ation. A simple regression of in￿ ation
on coord and tu alone yields strongly signi￿cant slope coe¢ cients, suggesting that labour market characteristics
matter for in￿ ation, but only through their impact on macroeconomic variables. In a related paper, Bowdler
and Nunziata (2004), we provide evidence on the role of labour market characteristics in setting average in￿ ation
within macroeconomic regimes.
11same period (10￿0:04￿0:10, where 0:10 measures the openness of the Japanese economy). The
di⁄erence in these impacts e⁄ects will be propagated over time given that the simulated autore-
gressive parameter for Canada, at 0:61, is approximately half as big again as that for Japan,
which is 0:43.
The model points to interesting di⁄erences in the unemployment-in￿ ation tradeo⁄ across
countries. Table 2 illustrates the most extreme case: Demand expansions that force down the
unemployment rate in Austria, Germany and Japan lead to an increase in in￿ ation that is only
one ￿fth of that observed in Canada and the United States. One explanation for this di⁄erence is
that unions in the highly coordinated labour markets of Austria, Germany and Japan moderate
pay claims during periods of rapid growth and low unemployment, and in return see wage growth
reduced by a smaller amount during times of recession and high unemployment.
The cross-country variation in productivity parameters is also quite large. In fact, in the
case of Japan the productivity variable actually changes sign, though as the derivative that has
been calculated is very close to zero we do not attach great importance to this outcome. The
di⁄erence between the maximum and minimum values of the indirect tax e⁄ect is also very large,
though it should be noted that the di⁄erence between Sweden (maximum impact e⁄ect) and
Spain (minimum impact e⁄ect) decays over time because the parameter for lagged in￿ ation is
smaller for Sweden than for Spain (results not shown in the table).
4.1 Robustness and sensitivity
The ￿rst robustness test that we perform involves adding to the regressions further interaction
terms based on alternative determinants of the speed of in￿ ation adjustment. The extra variables
that we consider are as follows:
￿ cbi is an updated version of Cukierman￿ s (1992) index of central bank independence pro-
vided by van Lelyveld (2000).
￿ er is the de facto exchange rate regime indicator due to Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004). This
is based on a scale of 1 ￿ 5, where higher values indicate greater exchange rate ￿ exibility.
￿ inft is a dummy variable set to unity for those years in the sample during which in￿ ation
targeting regimes were in e⁄ect for more than half of the year, namely Australia 1994 ￿ 95,
12Canada 1991 ￿ 95, Finland, 1993 ￿ 95, New Zealand 1990 ￿ 95, Spain 1994 ￿ 95, Sweden
1993 ￿ 95 and United Kingdom 1993 ￿ 95 (these dates are based on those quoted in Bratsiotis
et al (2002)).
￿ oilshock is a dummy variable set to unity during 1973, 1974, 1979 and 1980 for each
country. This allows for the possibility that in￿ ation dynamics behave di⁄erently during the
years of the major oil price hikes, as suggested in Burdekin and Siklos (1999).
￿ war is a dummy variable set to unity for those years during which a country was heavily
involved in an international war. These are as follows: Australia 1964￿73, France 1991, United
Kingdom 1982 and 1991 and United States 1964 ￿ 73 and 1991. This provides a check on the
Burdekin and Siklos (1999) claim that wars lead to changes in in￿ ation dynamics.
The results for these extended regression speci￿cations are presented in Table 3. In the ￿rst
column a zero mean version of cbi is interacted with each of the macroeconomic variables and
these terms are added to the preferred speci￿cation (Table 1, column 4). In order to avoid
clutter, only those additional regressors that are signi￿cant at the 5% level are reported in
the table (full details can be obtained on request). The parameter multiplying lagged in￿ ation
decreases with central bank independence. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of Boschen and
Weise (2004). Crucially from the point of view of this paper, the magnitude and statistical
signi￿cance of the labour market variables is very robust.
In column (2) we perform the same exercise for the exchange rate regime indicator. One ad-
ditional term proves signi￿cant, and indicates that in￿ ation is more responsive to unemployment
under ￿ exible exchange rate regimes. The results in column (3) indicate only a weak e⁄ect of in-
￿ ation targeting regimes on in￿ ation adjustment. This is probably due to the estimation sample
ending in 1995, which leaves little time for in￿ ation targeting schemes to take e⁄ect (Bratsiotis
et al (2002) discuss this point). In both columns the e⁄ects of labour market institutions are
robust, and the same is true in column (4), which contains interaction terms for oilshock and
war.
The ￿nal robustness check in this sub-section entails adding error correction type terms to the
regressions. Recall that in section 3 we discussed the role of error correction terms in empirical
in￿ ation equations. A typical error correction term takes the form (p￿￿￿ulc￿(1￿￿)ip) where
13p is the consumer price index, ulc unit labour costs and ip import prices. This expression can be
reformulated as real wages, minus productivity, plus real import prices. As explained previously,
we do not condition on wages given that wage adjustment is the channel through which labour
market institutions may a⁄ect in￿ ation dynamics. However, we can condition on the levels of
productivity and real import prices in order to obtain some insight into the impact of error
correction type terms on our results. In column (5) of Table 3 levelprod(￿1) is the lagged level
of the natural log of productivity multiplied by one minus average openness and realimport(￿1)
is the lag of the log ratio of import prices to consumer prices multiplied by average openness.11
The inclusion of the levels terms actually increases the absolute coe¢ cient values for import
and prod relative to Table 1, column (4). In most cases the relationships between labour market
institutions and in￿ ation dynamics are preserved, though two terms lose signi￿cance at the 5%
level, these being prod￿ztu (recall that we queried the sign of this variable during the discussion
at the start of this section) and import ￿ ztu. The interactions involving zcoord each remain
signi￿cant at the 5% level, though with some reduction in their quantitative importance.
Temporal stability The next robustness check that we perform entails estimating the pre-
ferred speci￿cation for the periods 1961 ￿ 79 and 1980 ￿ 95 in order to check the temporal
stability of the model. This is important because during the 1970s many countries used price
controls in order to limit in￿ ation, and these interventions may be the cause of structural breaks
in the regression coe¢ cients. The results are presented in Table 4 (the zero mean variables are
re-de￿ned for the sub-samples in order to ensure that they are exact). Each of the coe¢ cients
retain their signs from the full sample regression. The e⁄ects are often insigni￿cant at the 5%
level, especially during the ￿rst half of the sample in which the data are more noisy (the regres-
sion standard error is larger in the ￿rst column of Table 4 than in the second). However, only
in the case of the prod ￿ zcoord interaction is there a substantial loss of signi￿cance. Given that
some imprecision in the estimates is quite likely when reducing the sample by half, we focus
mainly on the behaviour of the point estimates. Bearing this criterion in mind, we note that
11These variables are not interacted with institutional indicators because such interactions would imply that
labour market variables a⁄ect the long-run elasticities of consumer prices with respect to import prices and
productivity, whereas the focus of this paper is short-run in￿ ation adjustment.
14the main examples of instability occur in the case of itax￿ztu, an e⁄ect that is mainly con￿ned
to the ￿rst half of the sample, and prod ￿ ztu (the term for which the regression coe¢ cient is
of unexpected sign) which exerts an e⁄ect during only the second half of the sample. Overall,
however, the magnitudes of the key interactions terms are quite robust and do not appear to
depend on speci￿c periods such as the 1970s.
Cross-sectional stability In Table 5 we present results from an evaluation of the cross-
sectional stability of the model. This exercise entails deleting one country at a time from
the panel, re-estimating the model for each of the 20 sub-samples, and then searching for the
maximum and minimum absolute values for each of the interactions presented in Table 1, column
4. These are reported in the second and third columns of the table, along with the corresponding
absolute t-ratios and the countries that are excluded in order to give the maxima and minima.
The ￿rst column summarises the full sample estimates. Overall, the results are encouraging, in
that the determinants of in￿ ation adjustment do not depend on any particular country, except
the prod ￿ zcoord term, which generates a t-ratio of 1:62 when Japan is excluded from the
sample. This is an isolated case, however, and the Japanese observations do not seem to be the
dominant source of cross-sectional variation in the coe¢ cients (the set of countries listed beneath
the coe¢ cients is quite varied). The maximum and minimum point estimates are almost always
within one standard error of their full sample counterparts, indicating that whilst there are some
cross-country di⁄erences in the way that labour market institutions a⁄ect in￿ ation dynamics,
these are not especially important and are unlikely to induce large biases in the estimation of
the pooled coe¢ cients.
A more stringent evaluation of cross-sectional stability entails deleting a group of countries
rather than one at a time. As the consumer price index in Australia, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom and the United States is a⁄ected by mortgage interest payments made by households
(at least during part of the sample), there is a case for expecting some di⁄erences in in￿ ation
adjustment in these countries. Thus, a model excluding these four countries was estimated. The
results (not reported here but available on request) show that the interaction terms remained
signi￿cant in most cases, though the unemp ￿ zcoord coe¢ cient did fall to 0:03 (t-ratio of 0:35).
On the other hand, the interaction term inf(￿1) ￿ zcoord generated a point estimate of ￿0:15
15(absolute t-ratio of 6:05), indicating that some of the results are much stronger in the sub-sample.
Alternative estimation methods and variable de￿nitions In Table 6 we report our ￿nal
set of robustness checks. The ￿rst column uses a feasible generalised least squares method to
estimate the preferred model, allowing for country speci￿c AR(1) error parameters and country
speci￿c heteroscedasticity.12 The second column presents the OLS coe¢ cient estimates obtained
previously but calculates standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation in the residuals
(these may arise if, for example, there exists a common shock to European in￿ ation rates that
is not accounted for by either the time dummies or the macroeconomic variables).13 In both
cases the relationship between labour market institutions and in￿ ation dynamics is robust.
The third column replaces unemp, the deviation of the unemployment rate from a HP(400)
trend, with the unadjusted unemployment series, simply denoted unemployment, in order to
investigate the e⁄ects of the detrending method. It appears that the impact of labour market
coordination on the response of in￿ ation to unemployment relies on the use of ￿ltered unem-
ployment data, since the interaction term unemployment ￿ zcoord is insigni￿cant in column (4)
and the point estimate actually changes sign. Furthermore, there is some weakening of the
interaction e⁄ects inf(￿1) ￿ zcoord and prod ￿ ztu. It is not surprising that the unadjusted
unemployment series leads to some changes in the results given that permanent shifts in the
equilibrium unemployment rate surely have occurred in some OECD countries during the period
since 1960. Therefore we do not emphasise the importance of the ￿nal column of results.
5 Summary
This paper has argued that in￿ ation adjustment in OECD countries may depend on labour
market structures. In highly coordinated labour markets trade unions are able and willing to
restrict the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of macroeconomic shocks through their wage-setting decisions.
On the other hand, greater monopoly power in labour supply, measured by the percentage
12Although earlier tests indicated that the average error autocorrelation across countries is zero, the e⁄ect may
be non-zero for some countries.
13The results in columns (1) and (2) were obtained using STATA 8.0. The column (2) results use the ￿ panel
corrected standard errors￿command.
16unionisation rate of the workforce, may lead to some ampli￿cation of the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of
macroeconomic shocks.
The results generally supported these hypotheses. In particular, the e⁄ect on in￿ ation of a 1%
change in unemployment, import prices and productivity was shown to be a decreasing function
of an index of labour market coordination, both within the ￿rst year of a shock and at longer
horizons. In contrast, these responses were found to be increasing in the percentage unionisation
of the workforce. The degree of central bank independence, the exchange rate regime and periods
of in￿ ation targeting and major international wars also played a role in determining international
di⁄erences in in￿ ation adjustment, but none of these factors eliminated the important e⁄ects
arising from labour market structures. These ￿ndings were, for the most part, robust to changes
in the sample size and the estimation method employed.
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17Appendix: data sources
inf is constructed from CPI data obtained from the OECD annual national accounts except
in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands, for which the source is the International Financial
Statistics database maintained by the International Monetary Fund.
unemp is based on unemployment data taken from Layard et al (1991) and is updated using
the OECD Employment Outlook 2000. The Portuguese data are from the London School of
Economics CEP-OECD database, and the data for Italy are based on the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics series, ￿unemployment rates on US concepts￿ .
import is constructed using import price indices and data on nominal import expenditures
and nominal GDP, all taken from the International Financial Statistics database maintained by
the International Monetary Fund.
prod is constructed using data for constant price GDP and total employment taken from the
OECD national accounts.
itax is constructed using data on total indirect taxes, total subsidies and total private ￿nal
expenditures, all extracted from the London School of Economics CEP-OECD database.
dtax is constructed using data on total direct taxes and households￿current receipts, the
source being the London School of Economics CEP-OECD database.
coord is an index from Belot and Van Ours (2000) and is constructed using OECD data on
bargaining coordination. Linear interpolation methods are used to obtain annual data for this
series.
tu is the ratio of employed union members to total employees. For European countries other
than Sweden the source is Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). For the other countries the sources
are Visser (1996) and Huber et al (1997). The latter series are updated by Nunziata (2004a).
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